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DIVISIBILITY OF COVENANTS IN OIL AND GAS
LEASES
By HmRm H. LEsAn*
INTRODUCTION
Modern oil and gas leases are generally of two types. Under
the "or" lease the lessee covenants to drill a well within a stipu-
lated time or pay a rental for delay.1 For failure either to drill
or pay the delay rental a forfeiture is usually provided. By the
terms of the "unless" lease the lease becomes void unless the
lessee either drills a well within a certain time or pays a certain
sum for an extension of time.2 If he neither drills nor makes
the extension payments in this type of lease, the lessee's estate,
being in the nature of a limitation, terminates without the neces-
sity of re-entry or action by the lessor.3 In both types the term
is relatively short, and a lease provides that it shall be extended
as long as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities.
It will be seen that in the "or" lease the lessee covenants in
the alternative, to drill or pay a delay rental. In the case of
the "unless" lease, the lessee is under no duty, but his estate is
subject to be divested if he fails to drill or make the extension
payments. There are also, in each type of lease, covenants con-
cerning royalties, but these are beyond the scope of this paper.
The lessor's chief interest in an oil and gas lease is in the
royalties derived from the production of oil and gas, which con-
stitute the principal consideration for the making of the lease.
Because of this fact and in pursuance of what is known as the
"doctrine of development", courts have implied certain cove-
nants in oil and gas leases which are designed to promote develop-
ment. These are the covenants to drill a test well within a
* A. B. (1934), and J. D. with high honors (1936), University of
Illinois; Sterling Fellow, Yale Law School, 1936-1937.
'See the Prairie Oil & Gas Company lease set out in Summers:
Law of Oil and Gas (1927) Sec. 264.
2 See the Producers' lease in Summers: Law of Oil and Gas (1927)
Sec. 262.
3 Summers: op. cit., Sec. 161, n. 41. Harris v. Kerns, 144 Okl. 228,
291 Pac. 100 (1930); W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex.
509, 19 S. W. (2d) 27- (1929); Woods v. Bost, 26 S. W. (2d) 299 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930); Keeler v. Dunbar, 37- F. (2d) 868, 869 (C. C. A. 5th,
1930).
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reasonable time, to reasonably develop the premises after dis-
covery of oil or gas, to protect the premises by drilling offset
wells, and to market the products of the wells.4 The covenant to
test, however, is not important under the "or" and "unless"
leases for in them there are provisions for delay. These cove-
nants may be expressed, but usually are not. As a remedy for
the breach of such covenants, the lessor may have an action for
damages. Normally, however, the lessor will seek to have the
lease canceled upon the theory of implied forfeiture, inade-
quacy of legal remedy, or abandonment.
I. THE PROBLEmX DEFINED
In imposing duties upon assignees of oil and gas leases for
the performance of covenants and conditions of such leases and
liabilities for breach of such covenants and conditions, courts
apply the ordinary rules of law applicable to covenants running
with the land in leasehold estates.5 All covenants of an oil and
gas lease respecting the payment of delay rentals, drilling of
test wells, reasonable development after discovery, drilling of
off-set wells, and payment of royalties and gas well rentals,
whether express or implied, are covenants running with the
leasehold interest and bind the assignee of the lessee upon the
theory that by the assignment of the entire interest of the lessee
to him there is privity of estate between the lessor and the as-
signee." The assignee of the whole interest of the lessee, by
virtue of his acceptance of the assignment, assumes all of the
duties of the lessee, takes subject to all of the liabilities imposed
upon him by the lease, and at the same time acquires all of the
rights and privileges of the lessee under the lease.
Aside from the total assignment, the lessee may make other
types of transfers of his interest. First, the lessee may make
a sublease in which he transfers something less than his interest
in all or a part of the land. In this situation, since there is no
privity of estate between the lessor and the sublessee, the sub-
lessee is not bound by the covenants of the lease.7 The sub-
' Summers: Law of Oil and Gas (1927) Sees. 126-131.
Summers: op. cit., Sec. 183.
0 Summers: op. cit., pp. 577-578, and cases cited; (1932) 79 A. L. R.
496; Lindow v. Southern Carbon Co., 5 F. Supp. 818 (W. D. La. 1932).(Implied covenant to protect.)
I 1 Tiffany: Law of Real Property (2d ed. 1920) Sec. 55b.
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lessee is, however, under liabilities that he lose his interest if the
conditions of the lease are not performed.s Conditions are usual-
ly expressed as covenants, with an added power on the part of
the lessor to terminate the lease for nonperformance of the
covenants. 9 Secondly, a lessee may transfer a part or all of his
interest under the lease by partial assignments; that is, he may
transfer all of his legal interest in one portion of the land to A,
in another portion of the land to B, etc. These partial assignees
are bound by the covenants of the lease because they are in
privity of estate with the lessor.10 They are likewise under
liabilities that their interest be terminated by breaches of tlie
conditions of the lease."
The second situation is of immediate concern here. Both
the lessee and his partial assignee have certain liabilities and
certain duties, express and implied, under the lease. More specifi-
cally, in the ordinary situation, the lessee holds his interest sub-
ject to the liability that it will be terminated if he does not drill
a well within a stipulated time or is not producing oil or gas at
the end of the term. Assuming that oil or gas has been dis-
covered, the lessee is under implied duties reasonably to develop
and protect the premises and market the products. The lessee's
partial assignee assumes these duties. Now, must the assignee
and the lessee each drill a well on his particular portion of the
land in order to avoid liability under the drilling clause, or will
one well on any portion of the land suffice? Must the lessee and
his partial assignee each develop and protect his particular por-
tion as a unit, or is the land as originally granted the unit for
these purposes? Courts faced with these questions have pro-
fessed to find the answers by relegating the covenants involved
into the categories of divisible and non-divisible covenants.
On the other side of the lease transaction, assume that there
are several joint lessors, or that the lessors are co-tenants, or
that the lessor assigns all his interest in portions of the land.
Who can enforce the liabilities under express provisions of the
8 1 Tiffany: op. cit., Sec. 87.
"See 2 Tiffany: Landlord and Tenant (1910) Sec. 194b.
'*1 Tiffany: Law of Real Property (2d ed. 1920) Sec. 56e.
U 1 Tiffany: op. cit., Sec. 87; 2 Tiffany: Landlord and Tenant
(1910) See. 194h; Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. Philadelphia Co., 158
Pa. 317, 27 Atl. 951 (1893).
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lease, or the duties under the implied covenants, of the lessee
and his assigns?
The problem, then, is to discover what is meant by divisi-
bility, what covenants, if any, are divisible, and what will make
covenants divisible or non-divisible. In so doing it will be ad-
vantageous to consider, in the order named, the lessee's liabili-
ties under the drilling and term clauses of the lease, the lessee's
duties under the implied covenants, the lessor's rights under such
covenants, and the provisions of leases which have been con-
strued to provide for divisibility.
II. LLnmiLrriEs UNDER THE DRiL1iNG AND TERM CLAUSES
It has been pointed out that in the "or" type of lease the
lessee covenants in the alternative. In actions to cancel the
lease for non-compliance with the drilling clause, the question
may be raised as to whether the drilling of a single well by the
lessee, his assignee or partial assignee, upon any part of the
leased premises is such compliance as will prevent a forfeiture.
The courts uniformly hold that the drilling of such a well will
save the whole lease. This is true whether the situation be one
in which there is a lease of a single tract with partial assignments
by the lessee, 12 or one in which the lessor of a single tract assigns
his interest in portions of the reversion,13 or one in which several
owners make a joint lease of their individually owned lands. 14
The lease may, of course, be kept in force by the payment
of rentals. Where the lessee has made partial assignments,
although each assignee may pay a proportionate part of the
rentals, the lease may still be terminated if the rent upon the
whole lease is not paid. One partial assignee may prevent a for-
feiture of the lease, however, by paying the whole of the rent, 15
and some leases expressly provide that the partial assignee may
prevent the termination of the lease as to his portion of the land
by paying a proportionate share of the rentals.'0
2 Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, 78 Ol. 158, 189 Pac. 540 (1920); Harris
v. Michael, 70 W. Va. 356, 73 S. E. 934 (1912).
"Keystone Gas Co. v. Allen, 227 Ky. 801, 14 S. W. (2d) 155 (1929);
see Wilson v. Purnell, 199 Ky. 218, 250 S. W. 850 (1923).
1 Ohio Oil Co. v. Fowler, 74 Ind. App. 1, 128 N. E. 626 (1920);
Nabors v. Producers' Oil Co., 140 La. 986, 74 So. 527 (1917-); see
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801, 808, 72 C. C. A. 213 (1905).
15 Broyles v. Gilman, 222 S. W. 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
" See part V.
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While there is no covenant on the part of the lessee under
an "unless" lease to drill, he is under a liability that his interest
be terminated if he fails to drill or pay for an extension of time.
The question presented, then, in determining whether or not the
lessee's interest under such a lease has terminated is similar to
that presented in the case of the "or" lease. Similarly, the drill-
ing of a well anywhere within the boundary of the land originally
leased will relieve the lessee and his assignee or partial assignee
of the liability that the lease be terminated, whether in the par-
ticular case the drilling has been done by the lessee, his assignee,
or his partial assignee.17 That the lessor has made an assign-
ment of his interest in a portion of the premises,' 8 or that the
lease was jointly given by several lessors and covers more than
one parcel of land,19 is immaterial.
An analogous problem may be found in the cases involving
termination under the habendum clause. Practically all present-
day leases are for a short definite term with the added provision
that the lease shall be extended as long thereafter as oil or gas is
produced in paying quantities. Regardless of the type of drill-
ing clause which a lease may contain, the lessee is under a liabil-
ity that his lease be terminated if oil or gas is not being produced
in paying quantities at the end of the term. As in the case of
the "unless" drilling clause, the lease is extended if oil or gas
is being produced in paying quantities from any part of the
leased land by the lessee, his assignee, or his partial assignee,2 0
even despite the fact that the lease embraces more than one
tract2 ' and is given by joint lessors. 22
"Pierce Oil Corp. v. Schacht, 75 Okl. 101, 181 Pac. 791 (1919);
Dow v. Whorley, 126 Okl. 175, 256 Pac. 56 (1926); Smith v. Gypsy
Oil Co., 130 Okl. 135, 265 Pac. 647 (1928); Fisher v. Crescent Oil Co.,
178 S. W. 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915). Cf. Battle v. Adams, 229 S. W.
930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
'!Walker v. Lane, 233 S. W. 634 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
"' Wilson v. Mitchell, 245 Ky. 55, 53 S. W. (2d) 175 (1932); Harness
v. Eastern Oil Co., 49 W. Va. 232, 38 S. E. 662 (1901); see United Pub-
lic Service Co. v. Eaton, 153 So. 702 (La. App. 1934).
-Cowman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 142 Kan. 762, 51 P. (2d) 988
(1935); Cadillac Oil & Gas Co. v. Harrison, 196 Ky. 290, 244 S. W. 669
(1922); Worrell v. Parsons, 133 Okl. 61, 271 Pac. 155 (1928); Galloway
v. Kroeger, 169 Okl. 645, 34 P. (2d) 250 (1934); see Liddo v. W. T. Wag-
goner Estate, 31 S. W. (2d) 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). Summers: Law
of Oil and Gas (1927) See. 88 and cases cited in note 47.
"Pierce Oil Corp. v. Schacht, 75 Okl. 101, 181 Pac. 731 (1919);
see Watchorn v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 5 IF. (2d) 636, 647- (C. C. A.
8th, 1925).
- South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. 961
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So, for the purpose of determining the liabilities of the lessee
and his assignees, the lease is said to be "entire'",23 meaning that
the liabilities are not altered by any division which the lessor or
lessee may choose to make of their interests.
III. DismmmlTY OF THE LEsSER'S DUTES UNDER IMPLIED
COVENANTS
It has been pointed out that there are four covenants gen-
erally implied in oil and gas leases. They are implied in order
to carry out the doctrine of development and to effectuate the
intention of the parties. Non-divisibility or divisibility of the
covenants is said to determine whether the duties of the lessee
and his assignees relate to the whole or to particular portions of
the land leased. Before examining the cases in detail it will be
necessary to draw some distinctions in order to clarify the de-
cisions.
First, it is obvious that the parties may stipulate in the
original lease that the lessee shall be under a duty to develop the
land with particular portions as units.24 Again, there may be
.an abandonment of a part of the premises, resulting in a court
rendering a decree for cancellation of the interest which does
not present a question of divisibility of covenants. 25 A court of
equity may in some instances give equitable relief against for-
feiture for breach of condition. 26  It may also cancel the lease
on grounds of fraud, mistake, or inadequacy of legal remedy
even though it does not consider that the implied covenants are
conditions.47 It follows that, in canceling a lease as to a part
of the land upon equitable grounds of fraud, mistake, or hard-
(1912); see Garrison v. Hogan, 297 Pac. 87, 90 (Cal. App. 1931);
Summers: Law of Oil and Gas (1927) See. 88 and eases cited, note 46.
" Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, 78 Okl. 158, 189 Pac. 540, 543 (1920).
' See part V.
See infra note 68.
1 Tiffany: Real Property (2d ed. 1920) See. 88.
2W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S. W.
(2d) 27 (1929); Rendleman v. Bartlett, 21 S. W. (2d) 58 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929); Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co., 73 W. Va. 215, 80 S. E.
368 (1913); Lamp v. Locke, 89 W. Va. 138, 108 S. E. 889 (1921); Ad-
kins v. Huntington Development Co., 113 W. Va. 490, 168 S. E. 366
(1932); Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 839, 169 S. E.
529 (1933); Dillard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 114 W. Va. 684, 173 S. E.
573 (1934).
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ship, a court is not necessarily announcing the doctrine that
covenants are divisible.28
Finally, under the principle, previously state, that an as-
signee of the lease on a part of the land takes subject to all the
conditions of the lease, a court does not hold that the covenants
are divisible when it cancels the partial assignee's interest upon
a showing that there has been a breach of covenant considering
the entire premises as the unit.2 9 There are a number of cases
where, in a suit against the lessee, the lease on a part of the land
has been canceled, or such relief indicated proper, that belong
in this class.30 It is apparent from the language in these
opinions that the court might have canceled the entire lease but
saved the lessee the undeveloped portion out of equitable con-
siderations.
As might be expected from the fact that the lessee covenants
for delay under modern leases, the precise question as to whether,
after a test well is drilled upon any part of the land, an assignee
of the lease upon another portion of the leased premises is under
a duty to test his part of the land seems not to have been directly
before the courts. Nor has the question of divisibility of the
2' See Adkins v. Huntington Development Co., 113 W. Va. 490, 168
S. E. 366 (1932); Dillard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 114 W. Va. 684, 173
S. E. 573 (1934). West Virginia is one of the jurisdictions holding
that the only remedy for breach of implied covenants alone is dam-
ages, that is, that the covenants are not conditions. See also Swope
v. Holmes, 169 La. 17, 124 So. 131 (1929) (allegation of fraud); Sum-
mers: Law of Oil and Gas (1927) Sees. 142-143.
Alford v. Dennis, 102 Kan. 403, 170 Pac. 1005 (1918), probably be-
longs here also.
If a court of equity, however, gives partial cancellation or divides
the land for purposes of an alternative decree without requiring the
lessor to prove the inadequacy of his legal remedy, one may question
whether this is not, in effect, holding that the covenants are condi-
tions and divisible. See Webb v. Croft, 120 Kan. 654, 244 Pac. 1033
(1926).
2'Drummond v. Alphin, 176 Ark. 1052, 4 S. W. (2d) 942 (1928);
Ezzell v. Oil Associates, 180 Ark. 802, 22 S. W. (2d) 1015 (1930);
Mistletoe Oil & Gas Co. v. Revelle, 117 Okl. 144, 245 Pac. 620 (1926),
explained in Worrell v. Parsons, 133 Okl. 61, 64, 271 Pac. 155, 157(1928). In W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19
S. W. (2d) 27 (1929), it did not appear that there had been any devel-
opment on the land as to which cancellation was not sought.
10 Stubbs v. Imperial Oil & Gas Products Co., 164 La. 689, 114 So.
595 (1927); Day v. Kansas City Pipe Lines Co., 87 Kan. 617, 125 Pac.
43 (1912); Brown v. Union Oil Co., 114 Kan. 166, 217 Pac. 286 (1923);
Coffinberry v. Sun Oil Co., 68 Ohio St. 488, 67 N. E. 1069 (1903); Pel-
ham Petroleum Co. v. North, 78 Okl. 39, 188 Pac. 1060 (1920); Carder
v. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 83 Okl. 243, 201 Pac. 252 (1921); Donald-
son v. Josey Oil Co., 106 Okl. 11, 232 Pac. 821 (1924).
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implied covenant to market the products been considered by the
courts. In Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.,81 the Su-
preme Court of the United States did say that there was a
breach of a duty to drill a test well upon the undeveloped por-
tion of the land. The case, however, seems to involve merely
an erroneous interpretation of the reasonably prudent opera-
tor test.
32
In Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Sledge,33 the Okla-
homa court had occasion to consider the question of divisibility
of the implied covenant to protect the land, along with the im-
plied covenant to develop after discovery. The lessee there made
a partial assignment of 40 acres, and the partial assignee drilled
one producing well. Finding a breach of the implied covenants
to develop and to protect, the trial court, in an action to cancel
the lease, canceled the lease but excepted 20 acres around the
producing well. On appeal the partial assignee argued that the
lease upon the whole 40 acres should be excepted from cancel-
lation, since there had been no breach of covenant as to that
portion of the land. In affirming the decree of cancellation, the
court overruled this contention, saying that "the division of
the lease or an assignment of a part thereof will not relieve the
lessee or his assigns from developing the property according to
the express and implied covenants of the lease".
As concerns the duties of the lessee, it should make no dif-
ference whether the lessor assigns the reversion in a part of the
land or whether he assigns the royalty interest on one portion.
In Galt v. Metscher,3 4 the lessor assigned the royalty interest
in the south one-half of the tract leased. The lessee drilled a
well, intending to drill it on the line so that the owners would
share the royalties equally; the well was in fact drilled four feet
north of the line. It was held that the assignee of the royalty
interest could not require the lessee to drill an off-set well on the
south one-half of the land, for "The rights of the lessee in the
oil and gas mining lease were fixed before any conveyance of
the royalty interest was made".
Since a breach of both the implied covenant to develop and
1292 U. S. 272, 64 Sup. Ct. 671 (1934).
"See the opinion in the Circuit Court: Mid-Continent Petroleum
Corp. v. Sauder, 67 P. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
"151 Okl. 160, 163, 3 P. (2d) 167, 170 (1931).
"103 Okl. 271, 272, 229 Pac. 522, 623 (1923).
K. L. J.--3
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the implied covenant to protect was alleged in Amerada Pe-
troleum Corporation v. Sledge,3 5 that case stands for the propo-
sition that the implied covenant to develop is indivisible.36 Like-
wise, where two tracts were leased by one instrument and seven-
teen wells were drilled on one of the tracts, it was held that the
implied covenant to develop was indivisible, that the develop-
ment was sufficient upon the lease as a whole, and cancellation
as to one tract at the suit of the lessor was refused.3 7
Where the lessor sells a part of the reversion, the assignee
of the lessor may attempt to secure cancellation of the lease in
so far as it affects his land. In this situation it has been held
that the lessee is under no implied obligation to develop each
particular tract of land. 38 The lessee's duty is to develop the
original tract as an entirety.
Again, where the lessee assigns his interest in a part of the
premises the lessor may seek to cancel the lease as to either the
portion retained or the portion assigned. In this situation some
confusion has arisen which necessitates an extended examination
of the cases. Hughes v. Cordell"3 and Duke v. Stewart40 held
-151 Okl. 160, 3 P. (2d) 167 (1931).
'
0 Accord: Worrell v. Parsons, 133 Okl. 61, 271 Pac. 155 (1928) (de-
velopment by the partial assignee).
3-Ardis v. Texas Co., 155 La. 790, 99 So. 600 (1924).
81McCallister v. Texas Co., 223 S. W. 859 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920);
Texas Co. v. Curry, 229 S. W. 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Stephenson
v. Glass, 276 S. W. 1110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
"And we think it proper to add that the lease executed by John
Black was to the four tracts, aggregating 800 acres as an entirety, and
plaintiffs, having purchased two of the tracts, could not divide that
contract into separate parts and enforce a forfeiture of the lease
in part only while it was valid as to the remainder. John Black, their
vendor, had no such rights, and the plaintiffs acquired no better right
than he possessed." McCallister v. Texas Co., supra, at 863.
"In other words, the purchaser of the subdivision took the same
estate that his vendor had; no more, no less .... He could not require
the lessee to drill any more or other wells, or upon other locations or
particular locations, not required of the lessee while the whole acre-
age embraced in the lease was intact .... The lessee's obligations were
not affected in any way whatever by the sale of a part of the whole
acreage covered by the lease." Stephenson v. Glass, supra, at 1113.
-174 Ark. 757, 296 S. W. 735 (1927).
40230 S. W. 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921), where the court said:
"Appellants leased their land as an entirety to John S. Stewart. He
assumed an obligation to develop this land or have it developed, accord-
ing to the terms of this lease. He did not agree to develop or have
developed any particular acre or any particular tract. . . . As the
sublessees held under him, he was privity to their development, and
the work done by Simms and Straiti accrued to his benefit and to the
benefit of his assigns as to the balance of the tract."
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that the implied covenant to develop was indivisible and that the
lessor could not forfeit the interest retained by the lessee with-
out showing a breach of covenant as applied to the whole of the
leased premises. 41
In Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Giller,4 2 however, the
court concluded that the covenants were divisible, citing Texas
cases and Thuss, Texas Ol and Gas,43 as authority for the
proposition that the Texas court holds that each assignee of the
lessee must properly develop his segregated portion. The suit
there was to cancel the portion of the lease assigned by the
lessee. The case of Cox v. Sinclair Gulf Oil Company,44 cited by
the court, does contain some language indicating that the court
thought the covenants divisible. The question before the court,
however, was one of misjoinder of parties defendant in a suit
to cancel the lease for abandonment, and the statements of the
court are quite conflicting.45 The case again reached the same
"Where the lessor did prove a breach of the covenant affecting
the entire premises, he was given a decree of cancellation: Ezzell v.
Oil Associates, 180 Ark. 802, 22 S. W. (2d) 1015 (1930); Drummond
v. Alphin, 176 Ark. 1052, 1058, 4 S. W. (2d) 942, 944 (1928). In the
latter case the court said:
"It was not the intention of this court, in the case of Hughes v.
Cordell, supra, to extend the doctrine of the cases there cited and fol-
lowed, and it is now held that, while the development of a portion of
a lease inures to the benefit of the original lessee, that fact does not
relieve the original lessee from the duty of proceeding with the devel-
opment of the tract as an entirety in the manner contemplated by the
express and implied covenants of the lease."
U183 Ark. 776, 779, 38 S. W. (2d) 766, 767 (1931), where the
court said:
"It appears from the record that several assignees of the various
parts of the 440-acre tract had drilled twenty-six wells, twenty-five of
which had produced, at the time of the trial, $180,000 in royalties for
appellee. We do not understand that appellant can justify his failure
to carry out the implied covenants in the lease on account of the large
recoveries of oil from certain parts of the land assigned to others. This
identical question has been decided against appellant's contention by
the Court of Appeals of Texas in the following cases: Cox v. Sinclair
Gulf Oil Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 265 S. W. 196; Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v.
Bryan (Tex. Civ. App.) 291 S. W. 692; Fisher v. Crescent Oil Co. (Tex.
Civ. App.) 178 S. W. 905."
1 (1929) p. 188.
"265 S. W. 196, 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). The court held that
there was a statement of a cause of action against all defendants for
abandonment and reversed the decision of the lower court.
""Appellees as assignees of Bailey secured just the same interest
that he had in the lease at the time of the assignment. They also
became bound to perform the express and implied covenants of the
lease which affected it as a whole, and, at least, became bound to de-
velop their respective segregated portions with diligence after the dis-
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court and the later opinion indicates that the language respect-
ing the question of divisibility in the first opinion was both er-
roneous and dicta. 46
In Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bryan,47 also cited as authority
for the proposition that covenants are divisible, there was one
lease of four tracts belonging to different owners. Although
the court affirmed an award of damages for failure of the lessee
to protect one of the tracts of land, the court did not hold that
the covenant was divisible. The court held that the lease itself
required each tract to be treated as a unit for purposes of de-
velopment. Fisher v. Crescent Oil Co.,48 the other case cited in
Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. G-ler, held that the drilling
of a producing well by the lessee's partial assignee on the land
covery well was drilled." If the first part of this statement is true,
the last part cannot be true. Probably the court was only intending
to show that the assignees were not free of implied duties.
S300 S. W. 116, 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). The lower court had
again found that the petition did not state a cause of action against
all defendants, concluding that, because Bailey had the right to seg-
regate and assign distinct portions, each assignee had the right to
develop the portion assigned to him without reference to whether the
lease as a whole had been developed in accordance with the express
and implied covenants. This court again reversed and remanded with
instructions to try the case on the merits, saying:
"Adjudication of the issue of Bailey's right to assign segregated
portions of the lease was not involved under appellants' pleadings, and
is not an issue either in law or in fact in the case; but the case pleaded
is that of failure to develop the lease as a whole by all of the defend-
ants, appellees here, and abandonment of the lease as a whole by all
of them. If any of the appellees have developed any portion of the
lease to such an extent that it constitutes development of the lease
as a whole, then such may be pleaded as a defense to this suit, but
such issue was not raised by any pleading by any appellee; and for
this reason we held in our original opinion that the trial court's find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law wholly ignore and do not adjudicate
the cause of action alleged by appellants."
11291 S. W. 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
-178 S. W. 905, 906-907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915), where the court
said:
"If it shall be determined under the terms of the contract that
discovering oil on the land leased was a compliance with the condition
of the contract, then we believe it was sufficient, if either of the
assignees discovered oil, to vest the right in the entire lease for the
25 years specified. It is not stipulated in the contract that oil should
be discovered under any particular portion of the land or discovered
in more places than one, but if oil was discovered the conveyance
'shall be in full force and effect for twenty-five years'. The conveyance
so continued was not to any particular portion of the land . . .We
therefore hold that the discovery of oil by one of the assignees Inured
to the benefit of both and to both parcels of land, in so far as it had
the effect of vesting the right."
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allotted him satisfied the drilling clause and saved the entire
lease.
None of the cases cited by the court in Standard Oil (o. of
Louisiana v. Giller as holding the covenants of a lease divisible
are authority for that proposition. As construed by the court,
the statement in Thuss49 represents a misinterpretation of the
Texas cases. Yet, there was good Arkansas authority to the
effect that the covenants implied in oil and gas leases are indi-
visible. 0
In Cosden Oil Co. v. Searborough,51 the Federal Court re-
versed an alternative decree canceling a lease as to 400 acres
upon the ground that there was no breach of the implied cove-
nant reasonably to develop, considering the 400 acres as the unit.
The original tract leased contained 10,254 acres. Citing Stand-
ard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Giller, supra, and the cas6s there
cited, the court indicated that the covenants were divisible.5 2
Since the court purported to be applying Texas law, it would
seem that no forfeiture could be decreed for breach of an im-
plied covenant.53 At most the case rests upon the decision in
Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Gifler, which was based upon
an erroneous interpretation of the Texas cases.
The court, however, cites one other case, W. T. Waggoner
Estate v. Sigler Oil Co.54 In that case there was a lease of 85,000
acres. The plaintiff sought to cancel the lease as to 3,000 acres
Texas Oil and Gas (1929) p. 188.
Hughes v. Cordell, 174 Ark. 757, 296 S. W. 735 (1927). See
Drummond v. Alphin, 176 Ark. 1052, 1058, 4 S. W. (2d) 942, 944 (1928),
quoted supra, note 41.
55 P. (2d) 634, 638 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932).
82 The court admitted that the drilling of a well on any part of
the land would satisfy the drilling covenant and vest the lessee's in-
terest, but said: "On the other hand, as to the implied covenant, which
running with the land is imposed on each taker of any part of the
lease as a consideration for his holding it, we think It is quite gen-
erally held that the contract is severable, imposing upon the holder of
each segregated part the obligation to develop that part without ref-
erence to the others."
Grubb v. McAfee, 109 Tex. 527, 212 S. W. 464 (1919); Pierce v.
Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 225 S. W. 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920);
Texas Co. v. Curry, 229 S. W. 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Marnett
Oil & Gas Co. v. Munsey, 232 S. W. 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Stitz v.
National Producing & Refining Co., 247 S. W. 657 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923); Texas Co. v. Davis, 113 Tex. 321, 254 S. W. 304 (1923); W. T.
Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S. W. (2d) 27, 28
(1929).
51118 Tex. 509, 515, 19 S. W. (2d) 27, 28 (1929).
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which had been assigned to the defendant. The Commission of
Appeals canceled the lease as to all except 10 acres upon which
two producing wells had been drilled. In reversing the decree
the Supreme Court pointed out that, in absence of proof of aban-
donment or inadequacy of legal remedy, the lessor's only remedy
for breach of an implied covenant is an action for damages.
Incidentally, the court said that there was an implied duty that
the defendant develop his 3,000 acres. Nevertheless, it cannot be
said that the court held the covenants divisible. For, first, it
does not appear that there was any development on the remain-
der of the 85,000 acres; so the court may have been talking about
the defendant's duty under the covenants, considering them as
entire. In the second place, even if the court did hold that there
was a duty to develop the 3,000 acres as an independent unit,
there was a provision in the lease which has been construed as
making leases divisible.55
There was, of course, ample Texas authority that the express
and implied covenants of an oil and gas lease are indivisible.50
And, aside from the holdings in Standard Oil Co..v. Giller and
Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, supra, both based upon a misin-
terpretation of the existing decisions, it seems that no court has
directly held the implied covenants of an oil and gas lease divis-
ible, although there are some dicta to that effect.
The covenants, express5 and implied, in the ordinary lease,
then, are non-divisible. It should be immaterial whether the
relief sought is an action for damages, cancellation upon the
theory of implied forfeiture, in jurisdictions where such is per-
15The court said: "The estate of either party under the contract
was declared to be assignable in whole or in part and the assignee of
the lessee as to only a part of the leased lands was to continue pay-
ments of no more than his proportionate part of the rentals".
The lease also provided that "each producing well shall hold 2,000
acres in a square, said well to be the center and said 2,000 acres shall
be released as to further annual rental". See the second appeal of this
case: Liddo Oil Co. v. W. T. Waggoner Estate, 31 S. W. (2d) 154
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
W Fisher v. Crescent Oil Co., 178 S. W. 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915);
McCallister v. Texas Co., 223 S. W. 859 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Duke
v. Stewart, 230 S. W. 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Walker v. Lane, 233
S. W. 634 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Texas Co. v. Curry, 229 S. W. 643
(Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Stephenson v. Glass, 276 S. W. 1110 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925). See Cox v. Sinclair Gulf Oil Co., 300 S. W. 116, 118 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927), quoted supra note 46.
r See Watchorn v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 5 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A.
8th, 1925).
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mitted, or cancellation upon the theory of inadequacy of legal
remedy. The plaintiff must first show a breach of covenant. He
can do so only by showing, "as a matter of fact",5 8 that the
lessee and his assigns have failed to comply with such covenants
considering them as entire. *While this conclusion is correct, the
cases on partial abandonment are somewhat troublesome.
It is well-settled that a lease may be terminated by abandon-
ment where the lessee's acts establish as a fact his intention to
relinquish his interest.59 It has also been held that there may be
an abandonment of a part of the premises.60 The lessee could
surrender a part of the leased land, and there is no theoretical
difficulty in a partial abandonment. A breach of an implied
covenant, however, is practically always relied upon to establish
the intention to abandon. 1 It would seem, then, that there can-
not be an abandonment of a part of the premises if there is no
breach of covenant, considering the whole lease as a unit, without
violating the rule that covenants are indivisible. 2
The question was before the Texas Court in Leonard v.
Prater,0 3 and the court held that there was a partial abandon-
ment. While an appeal of that case was pending, doubts were
expressed in Scott v. Jackson64 as to the validity of partial aban-
donment where there was no breach of covenant. The court said,
"It is difficult for us to see how one in possession of a tract of
land under one title may abandon his title to a portion of his
estate when that estate is, as here, indivisible, but that question
is now pending in the Supreme Court in the case of Leonard v.
'"It cannot be said as a matter of law that, under the terms of
this contract, there is not due and proper development for gas unless
a well is drilled on each parcel of land included therein. What is due
and proper development of the entire tract is a question of fact."
Watchorn v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 5 F. (2d) 636, 650 (C. C. A.
8th, 1925).
19Summers: Law of Oil and Gas (1927) Sees. 162-166.
6 American Wholesale Corp. v. F. & S. Oil & Gas Co., 242 Ky. 356,
46 S. W. (2d) 498 (1932); Highfield Co. v. Kirk, 248 Pa. 19, 93 Atl.
815 (1915).
O For example, see Hughes v. Cordell, 174 Ark. 757, 296 S. W. 735
(1927); Highfield Co. v. Kirk, 248 Pa. 19, 93 Atl. 815 (1915); Grubb
v. McAfee, 109 Tex. 527, 212 S. W. 467 (1919); Chapman v. Ellis, 254
S. W. 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
American Wholesale Corp. v. F. & S. Oil Co., 242 Ky. 356, 46 S. W.
(2d) 498 (1932). There the court thought that the implied cove-
nants were divisible.
18 S. W. (2d) 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
37 S. W. (2d) 1068, 1070 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
KENTUCKY LAw JOURxAL
Prather, supra, and'the law will probably be declared before this
case can be retried".
The second case of Leonard v. PraterO reversed the decision
in the previous case, and it was indicated that there could be
no intention to abandon while the lessee is in possession and
developing a part of the land.06  Likewise, in Arkansas, it has
been properly held that there can be no abandonment of a part
of the land when there is no breach of covenant, 7 although the
lessor may secure cancellation of the lease as to the undeveloped
portion if there is a breach of covenant as to the whole lease. 63
By way of summary, consider the situation where A leases
to B 80 acres of land for oil and gas purposes. Suppose that B
drills six producing wells upon 60 acres and there are no wells
upon the adjoining land. A sues to cancel the lease upon the 20
acres. B comes into court and proves that the development is
sufficient upon the whole lease, that no reasonably prudent opera-
tor would drill any more wells either on the 60 acres or upon the
undeveloped 20 acres. Upon this state of facts, there is no
breach of any covenant. It would seem obvious that A should
have no remedy whatsoever. 9 He could not get damages and
he ought not be granted cancellation of a part of the lease upon
any theory. The same conclusion should be reached if B had
assigned the lease on the 60 acres to C prior to any drilling, and
C had developed as set out above, and A had sued B to secure
cancellation of the lease as to the 20 acres he retained.70
-36 S. W. (2d) 216 (Tex. Com. App. 1931).
See also Liddo Oil Co. v. W. T. Waggoner Estate, 31 S. W. (2d)
154, 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
"Hughes v. Cordell, 174 Ark. 757, 296 S. W. 735 (1927).
"Drummond v. Ailphin, 176 Ark. 1052, 4 S. W. (2d) 942 (1928);
Ezzell v. Oil Associates, 180 Ark. 802, 22 S. W. (2d) 1015 (1930).
"The result in Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation,
292 U. S. 272, 54 Sup. Ct. 671 (1934), American Wholesale Corp v.
F. & S. Oil Co., 242 Ky. 356, 46 S. W. (2d) 498 (1932), and Highfield
Co. v. Kirk, 248 Pa. 19, 93 Atl. 815 (1915) must be condemned on this
ground.
" This was the situation in Worrell v. Parsons, 133 Okl. 61, 64,
271 Pac. 155, 157 (1928). In refusing the lessor any relief, the court
said: "In the instant case the trial court found, and we think the evi-
dence abundantly supports his finding, that the property of plaintiff
embraced in the original lease had been diligently operated and de-
veloped, and that, even though all operations had been confined to the
60-acre tract, under all the facts and circumstances surrounding this
case, all the rights of the plaintiff had been fully protected. Consider-
able testimony was produced on this point, and we think it was clearly
established that under all the facts and circumstances in this case no
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Assume, upon the other hand, a similar lease, but B or his
assignee has drilled only one well upon the 60 acres, and there
are a number of paying wells on lands adjoining on each side of
the leased tract. B comes into court and says that, while it may
be that a reasonably prudent operator would further develop the
premises, he has complied with the drilling clauses of the lease
and that is all he intends to do. There is a breach of covenant,
and A certainly ought to have a remedy in damages. If he so
desires, he ought to be able to secure cancellation of the lease
upon the theory of implied forfeiture, in jurisdictions that per-
mit such, upon the theory of inadequacy of legal remedy, or
upon the theory of abandonment. Any such relief given will
not offend the rule that the covenants are non-divisible, and that
neither the lessor nor the lessee may increase the burdens or
benefits of himself or the other by any divisions he may make of
his interest.
IV. DIVIsIBILITY OF THE LESSOR'S RIGHTS
Upon the lessor's side of a lease, the question arises as to
whom run the benefits of the covenants. If cancellation is
sought for breach of covenant, the covenants are being treated
as conditions. At common law it was held that where the rever-
sion in a part of the land was assigned the conditions of a lease
upon such land were not thereby apportioned, but destroyed.7 1
The rule has been severely criticized, and it has been said that in
the United States it has been recognized only to be distin-
guished.1 2 It remained the law in England, however, until
changed by statute.7 3
In Brewster v. Lanyou Zinc Co.,74 the court said, "No refer-
ence is made by learned counsel for the appellee to the rule that,
where the reversion in part of the demised lands is assigned,
duty rested upon defendants to develop this 20 acres, either under the
terms of the lease itself or the law applicable thereto."
"1 Tiffany: Law of Real Property (2d ed. 1920) Sec. 86c; 1 Tay-
lor's Landlord and Tenant (8th ed. 1887) Sec. 296; 2 Cruise on Real
Property (1885) Tit. XIII, c. II, Sec. 58.
The rule was not applied to an apportionment by act of law: 1 Tif-
fany: Law of Real Property (2d ed. 1920) Sec. 86c; Cruger v. McLaury,
41 N. Y. 219, 223 (1869). Cf. Cochran v. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana,
139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718 (1916).
'Willard: Dumpor's Case (1873) 7 Am. L. Rev. 616.
"See Piggott v. Middlesex County Council [1909] 1 Ch. 134.
"140 Fed. 801, 808 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905).
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neither the lessor nor the assignee can take advantage of a condi-
tion broken, because the condition, being entire, is not appor-
tioned by the assignment, but destroyed. . . . It is therefore
assumed that the rule is not in force in the state of Kansas."
Whatever the reason may be, it has never been contended that
the conditions of a lease are destroyed by an assignment by
the lessor of his interest in a portion of the land.
Some jurisdictions, however, require that tenants in common
join in giving notice of forfeiture,75 where notice is necessary,
and in suing for cancellation of the lease.7 6 There is a conflict
in the cases, however, as to whether the lessor may sue the lessee
without joining persons to whom he has assigned an undivided
share in the royalty interest.7 7 In support of the rule requiring
joinder of tenants in common it is argued that those co-tenants
who secure a decree canceling the lease in so far as it affects
them may then claim an equal interest in the oil and gas re-
covered by the lessee as non-joining co-tenants. The rule, how-
ever, has been criticized,7 8 and it is difficult to see why the courts
should be so concerned in protecting a lessee who has breached
the conditions of his lease.
Where the lessor has assigned his interest in part of the
land, it would seem reasonable, if there has been a breach of the
covenants considering the lease as entire, to allow either the
lessor or a partial assignee of the lessor the benefit of the cove-
nant.7 9 Since the lessee has been guilty of a breach, any one
whose interest is affected should have a remedy.8 0 In some cases
1 Jameson v. Chanslor-Canfield Midway Oil Co., 176 Cal. 1, 167
Pac. 369 (1917).
6 North Cent. Texas Oil Co. v. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana, 159
La. 403, 105 So. 411 (1925); Castile v. Texas Co., 170 La. 887, 129 So.
518 (1930); Howard v. Manning, 79 Okl. 165, 192 Pac. 358 (1920);
Hawkins v. Klein, 124 Okl. 161, 255 Pac. 570 (1926); Utilities Produc-
tion Co. v. Riddle, 161 Okl. 99, 16 P. (2d) 1092 (1932); Vaughn v.
Littlefield, 4 S. W. (2d) 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
'; That it is unnecessary to join the assignee of a portion of the
royalty interest: Bayside Land Co. v. Dabney, 90 Cal. App. 122, 265
Pac. 564 (1928); Thiessen v. Weber, 128 Kan. 556, 278 Pac. 770 (1929);
contra: Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Gillem, 212 Ky. 293, 279 S. W. 626
(1925); Bishop v. Sanford, 35 S. W. (2d) 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
18See the concurring opinion in Gypsy Oil Co. v. Champlin, 163
Okl. 226, 22 P. (2d) 102, 104 (1933).
' Cf. Metzler & Co. of California v. Stevenson, 217 Cal. 236, 18 P.
(2d) 330 (1933).
0 See Hitt v. Henderson, 112 Okl. 194, 240 Pac. 745 (1925), where
an assignee of the reversion in a part of the land was allowed to
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partial assignees have been allowed to sue without joining the
lessor and without the question of joinder being raised.8 ' Yet,
since these suits to enforce the lessee's covenants are usually
brought in equity, it is probable that the lessor and his partial
assignee are both necessary parties, but it would seem that the
non-joining party could be made a party defendant, as has been
done where he fraudulently refused to join.82
V. ExPREss PROVISIONS MLKING COVENANTS DIVISmLE
While the lessee under the ordinary oil and gas lease is
under a duty to develop the leased land as a unit, the parties
may stipulate that he shall develop separate portions as units.
If such is the intention, then it ought to be given effect, and the
implied covenants should attach to the individual tracts. The
question that arises is what language will be sufficient to show
such an intention.
In the situation where the lessor leases a single tract of land,
the lease upon a part of which is later conveyed by the lessee,
the Louisiana Court has held that a provision which permits par-
tial assignments and allows the partial assignee to extend the
lease as to his portion by paying a proportionate part of the
delay rentals makes the covenants divisible upon assignment.8 3
Where the lessee retains an overriding royalty, however, the
court has construed the transaction as a sublease, and held that
the covenants remain indivisibleS4 Yet, the general rule is
maintain a suit to cancel the lease, in so far as it affected his portion,
for abandonment, without joining the other owners.
11 See McCallister v. Texas Co., 223 S. W. 859 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920);
Texas Co. v. Curry, 229 S. W. 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921)1 Stephenson
v. Glass, 276 S. W. 1110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
Bayside Land Co. v. Dabney, 90 Cal. App. 126, 265 Pac. 566
(1928).
bJ The provision which the court said made the lease divisible in
Swope v. Holmes, 169 La. 17, 124 So. 131 (1929), was as follows: "It
Is hereby agreed in the event this lease shall be assigned as to part or
as to parts of the above described lands, and the assignee or assignees
of such part or parts shall fail or make default in the payment of the
proportionate part of the rents due for him to them, such default shall
not operate to defeat or affect this lease in so far as it covers a part
or parts of said lands upon which said lessee or assignee thereof
shall make due payment of said rental."
Similar: Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173 La. 314, 137 So. 46(1931); Harrell v. United Carbon Co., 52 P. (2d) 790 (C. C. A. 5th,
1931). Similar in effect: Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 165 La. 907, 116 So. 379
(1928).
61 Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 165 La. 907, 116 So. 379 (1928). Cf. John-
son v. Moody, 168 La. 799, 123 So. 330 (1929).
KuNTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
that a transfer for the entire term is an assignment, not a sub-
lease, even though the transferor reserves rent, etc.85
This view is questionable. For the lessee could assign with-
out an express provision therefor; and rents are apportionable
without an express provision.86 The only thing this provision
adds is that the partial assignee may extend the lease as to his
portion of the land, even though it may terminate as to the
remaining portions. Under a lease containing a similar pro-
vision, it was held in Yolng v. JonessT that a lessee who reac-
quired the lease upon the whole of the land, after making a
partial assignment, could not save a portion of the premises by
making the extension payments only upon it. The inference is
that the lease is non-divisible except in the actual situation pro-
vided for by the provision.88
This latter view was sustained in Smith v. Gypsy Oil Co.,89
where the court said: "From the language of the lease contract
it is clear that it was intended that that part of the contract here-
inabove quoted was intended to provide for the payment of
rentals and royalties, in case of assignment of a portion of the
lease, and not intended to make provision for development of
assigned portions of the premises in a different method than that
provided in the lease contract. In the absence of such specific
provision in the contract this court has repeatedly held that the
development of one portion of the premises covered by the lease
will keep in full force and effect the lease covering the other
portions."
If a lessor executes separate leases, covering different tracts,
though they are all given to the same lessee and executed on the
same day, it would seem reasonable to infer that it was intended
that each tract should be treated separately for purposes of
development.90 A similar conclusion would seem proper where
1 1 Tiffany: Law of Real Property (2d ed. 1920) Sec. 55.
w Stevenson v. Lombard, 2 East 575 (1802).
I 222 S. W. 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
8 Similarly held where the lessee did not make a bona fide assign-
ment: Flanigan v. Stern, 204 Ky. 814, 265 S. W. 324 (1924).
That the conditions of a lease may be indivisible although the
covenants to pay rent are divisible, see Koppers Co. v. Asher Coal
Min. Co., 226 Ky. 492, 11 S. W. (2d) 114, 116 (1928).
- 130 Okl. 135, 136, 265 Pac. 647, 648 (1928). It was held that a
well commenced by the lessee's partial assignee within the term saved
the whole lease.
"Newell v. McMillan, 139 Kan. 94, 30 P. (2d) 126 (1934).
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a joint lease provides that the lessee must drill on some part of
the land owned by each lessor.91
It is believed that the better rule is expressed by those cases
which hold that the lease is ordinarily indivisible and that any
provision providing for divisibility should be limited to the
actual situation provided for by such provision. If the parties
intend that separate portions of the entire land covered by the
lease should be developed as units, the lease should expressly so
state.92
CONCLUSION
Despite the statements to the contrary in Standard Oil Co.
v. Gille;,93 and Cosden Oil Go. v. Scarborough,94 under the ordi-
nary oil and gas lease, the lessee's duties under the implied cove-
nants,95 as well as his liabilities under the drilling and term
clauses,90 are indivisible. The lessee's duties of development
relate to the whole of the land leased, and not to separate units.
Neither the lessor nor the lessee, merely by dividing his interest,
can in any way change these duties into duties to develop par-
ticular portions of the demised premises as individual units.
"He could not require the lessee to drill any more or other wells,
or upon other locations or particular locations, not required of the
lessee while the whole acreage embraced in the lease was intact....
The lessee's obligations were not affected in any way whatever by the
sale of a part of the whole acreage covered by the lease."' ,
Even were there no authority to support this contention, a
court confronted with the problem should reach the same con-
clusion. Certainly no court would hold that each person taking
an assignment of a part of the lease is under a duty to drill wells
"0 dward v. Foster, 5 S. W. (2d) 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). Cf.
Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bryan, 291 S. W. 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927);
Read v. Gibson & Johnson, 12 S. W. (2d) 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928);
Gibson & Johnson v. Ward, 35 S. W. (2d) 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931);
Gibson & Johnson v. Hill, 34 S. W. (2d) 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
For a similar result where one lessor leased several tracts, see Jack-
son v. Kent, 106 W. Va. 37, 145 S. E. 572 (1928).
"This inference has been drawn from a drilling clause which pro-
vides that delay rental is liquidated by the drilling of a well only upon
the particular 40 acres or quarter section of land upon which the well
is drilled: Wescott v. Bailey, 109 Kan. 163, 198 Pac. 189 (1921); Pro-
ducers Oil Co. v. Snyder, 190 S. W. 514 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
"3183 Ark. 776, 38 S. W. (2d) 766 (1931).
"55 F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932).
"See cases cited supra notes 33-34, 36-41.
"See cases cited supra notes 12-14, 17-22.
"Stephenson v. Glass, 276 S. W. 1110, 1113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
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to offset those drilled by other partial assignees deriving their
interests from the same source, that is, that the implied covenant
to protect the premises is divisible. Yet, carried to its logical
conclusion, a rule that the covenants are divisible would lead to
such a result. For example, consider the situation diagramed
in Figure 1. A leases a tract of land, containing 180 acres, to B
for oil and gas purposes. B makes partial assignments of his
interest to C, D, and E, in the manner indicated by the solid
lines. A sells the reversion in three portions to F, G, and H, in the
manner indicated by the dotted lines. Suppose that D drills
four wells (w) on tract 5, as indicated. If the covenants are
considered divisible, the logical result would be that offset wells
must be drilled on each of the other eight tracts, and each tract
of 20 acres must be developed as a unit. It is believed that no
court would go so far.98
A
1 2 3 C
W w
B 4 5 1 D
zW W
7 8 9 
F G H
Figure 1.
The rule of indivisibility of covenants is further
strengthened by a reference to policy. In the early history of
the oil and gas industry the courts, upon the basis of physical
and economic facts with which they were coversant, construed
oil and gas leases so as to promote development and prevent
delay. By implication, they created many duties on the part of
the lessee where the lease did not, or from the nature of the
subject matter could not, so do; and they set up the reasonable
prudent operator test for measuring compliance with such im-
plied duties. In so doing the courts did what they conceived
"
8See Galt v. Metscher, 103 Ok. 271, 229 Pac. 522 (1923), com-
mented upon supra, note 34.
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to be to the best interests of both parties to the lease and to
society generally. Now, new physical and economic facts of oil
and gas have been discovered, or have come into existence, which
indicate that the means invented by the courts to achieve these
purposes no longer attain the desired end.
Briefly, it may be pointed out that gas performs two im-
portant functions in the production of oil. Its dissolution with
the oil gives the latter the desirable qualities for propulsion
through the sand and the pressure of its expansive force acts to
drive the oil to the point of lowest pressure in the sand, that is,
the well opening.99  Modern scientific knowledge and methods
make it possible to balance these two functions.10 0 The maxi-
mum amount of oil is recovered under conditions of wide spacing
and slow drainage.10 Over-drilling causes large production,
resulting in a low price which encourages waste; it also destroys
the balance between the two functions of natural gas so that it is
not possible to recover the maximum amount of oil. Under
these circumstances, even the application of the doctrine of im-
plied covenants and the reasonably prudent operator test to the
lease as a whole may result in waste, contrary to the best interests
of the parties and the policy of conservation. In the face of
such circumstances, no rule of construction should be adopted
which will tend to increase development further. The duties of
the lessee, his assignee or partial assignee, should be determined
by the lessee's duties under the original lease. In the ordinary
lease, the lessee's express duties center about the entire tract
leased as a unit. His implied duties should rest upon the same
basis. Public interest in conservation and private interests of
lessor and lessee in profits would justify such a conclusion in the
absence of authority.
It follows that in order for the lessor to have any remedy
he must show a breach of covenant upon the entire lease or a
liability of similar nature. If there is no such breach, the lessor,
his assignee or his partial assignee, should not be able to main-
tain a suit against the lessee, his assignee, or his partial assignee,
upon any theory.'0 2
99 Miller: Functions of Natural Gas in the Production of Oil (1929)
p. 40.
Iiller: op. cit., p. 47.
""'Miller: op. cit., p. 52.
'Worrell v. Parsons, 133 Oki. 61, 271 Pac. 155 (1928).
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If, however, there is a breach of covenant upon the entire
lease, anyone affected by the breach and in privity of estate with
the lessor, should be allowed to maintain an action. There
would seem to be no reason to deny an assignee of the lessor's
interest in a part of the land a remedy merely because he is
unable to get the other owners to join with him in a suit to
enforce the covenants. Yet, some jurisdictions do require that
lessors who are tenants in common join in notice of forfeiture
and in a suit against the lessee. At most, it would seem suffi-
cient if the lessor, who refuses to join his partial assignee in a
suit against the lessee, is made a defendant.
While the lessee's duties under the usual form of lease are
indivisible, if the parties have stipulated that his duty shall be
to develop the lease in portions, and not as a whole, then that
duty must be enforced. It should be plain, however, that such
was the intention, and a mere stipulation that the rent shall be
apportioned in cases of partial assignments would seem insuf-
ficient.10 3
.101 Smith v. Gypsy Oil Co., 130 Okl. 135, 265 Pac. 647 (1928); see
Young v. Jones, 222 S. W. 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
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